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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELDON E. RASMUSSEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
— vs. — 
UNITED STATES STEEL COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF 
This reply brief is filed that the questions to be here 
determined may be clarified and that misleading state-
ments and confusing arguments may be eliminated from 
the Court's consideration. 
I t is contended by respondent that the implied in 
fact contract upon which he relies was formed on August 
3, 1948, based upon prior custom and publications. (Resp. 
Brief p. 14) It is appellant's position that there were no 
publications or prior custom upon which respondent justi-
fiably could rely to support his contention. 
I Case No. 
f 8081 
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I. 
There were no publications prior to August 3, 1948* or 
prior to respondent's termination^ upon which respondent 
could justifiably rely to establish his alleged implied in fact 
contract. 
A. Prior to August 3, 1948 there were no company 
or corporation publications pertaining to a job evaluation 
program for non-exempt salaried employees of Geneva 
Steel Company. 
*" Q3! May 7, 1947, a Wage Rate Inequity Agree-
ment was negotiated between Geneva Steel Company and 
the United Steel Workers of America, CIO, representing 
hourly production, and maintenance employees within 
the Geneva plantsite providing for a job evaluation pro-
gram for production and maintenance -jobsjmly. This 
I agreement was the first of its kind at Geneva Steel Com-
/ pany and had no application to or connection with sala-
ried positions of any kind at Geneva Steel Company. 
2. The joint announcement of June 25, 1948 (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 5) referred only to the program as it ap-
plied to the above-mentioned wage rate inequities agree-
ment and there is no reference or indication, express or 
implied, of the extension or application of any kind of 
program for non-exempt salaried workers of Geneva 
Steel Company. It should be noted that at that time the 
CIO Steel Workers Union had no connection whatso-
ever with any clerical or salaried employees at Geneva 
Steel Company and therefore any such statement involv-
2 
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ing the Steel Workers Union would not be applicable 
to such salaried employees. 
B. The letter of August 3, 1948, was not intended 
to, did not and could not apply to, or be understood as 
applying to respondent and could not be the basis upon 
which to establish an implied in fact contract. 
I t is now contended by respondent that the implied 
in fact contract upon which he relies was formed on 
August 3, 1948. (Resp. Brief p. 14) The further state-
ment is made that the Witness Nelson and respondent 
saw and "understood the announcement as applying to 
them." (Resp. Brief p. 11) 
What they may have seen or understood is, of course, 
of no consequence unless appellant was, in some way, 
responsible for having created that understanding or al-
lowed* it to exist. (1) The letter referred to (Ex. P-3) was 
directed to Plant Department Heads, not to any non-
exempt personnel in or out of the General Offices. More-
over, it specifically states that the department head was 
to notify employees in his department by personal con-
tact and that the information which followed was for his 
use in making said personal contact. (2) The fact is 
that neither the Witness Nelson nor respondent testified 
that he even saw the letter, much less that he understood 
it applied to him. Mr. Nelson stated: 
" I don't remember having seen this letter." 
(R. 128) 
and the respondent: 
3 
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"Q. I will show you what is marked Plain tiff's 
Exhibit 3 and ask you if you remember seeing 
that bulletin? 
A. I saw something that gave that information. 
Q. You don't remember whether this is the 
identical one you saw which contained that 
information, is that right? 
A. That is right." (E. 160) 
Counsel cannot be serious in his contention that an 
employee in the General Office could believe that the 
letter applied to him. Even if it be conceded that "all 
salaried employees" and "members of plant personnel" 
are two distinct groups as counsel atoues, the fact re-
mains that all employees referred to vMre given a $17.00 
a month increase. The reference to a salary inequities 
program is that such a program will be undertaken with 
respect to "said non-exempt salaried positions." "Said" 
positions could be none other than those next above de-
scribed, i.e., those who received a $17.00 raise. Respond-
ent received, not a similar or comparable raise, but one 
of more than 150% of that increase, to wit, $26.0Q a 
month. (R, 51) *^' 
Respondent's increase was the 10% referred to in 
the first paragraph of the notice; he could with equal 
propriety claim to be included among that group, "Ex-
empt Salaried Personnel," as to which there never has 
been a job evaluation program or any retroactive salary 
adjustments. 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C There was no publication subsequent to August 
8,1948 of any kind by Geneva Steel Company referring 
to the general office salary evaluation program untU 
after respondent had terminated his employment with 
Geneva Steel Company. 
1. The United States Steel News article dated July, 
1#50 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 14) refers to an agreement exe-
cuted between the CIO Steel Workers Union and certain 
subsidiary companies of United States Steel Corporation. 
I t was a salary inequities agreement negotiated between 
those companies and the Steel Workers Union and had 
application only to the salaried employees in the com-
panies represented by the United Steel Workers of 
America, CIO. Geneva Steel Company was not a party 
to any of those agreements and therefore they could not 
bind Geneva Steel Company in any way either by appli-
cation or by implication. Moreover, these agreements ap-
plied only to salaried workers represented by the union 
and had on application whatsoever to salaried employees 
in the General Offices of any of the companies involved. 
2. Salary Inequities Agreement — Geneva Steel 
Company and United Steel Workers of America, CIO, 
dated July 27,1950: 
(a) This agreement applied only to salaried em-
ployees represented by the CIO Steel Workers Union. 
There is no reference or indication that this agreement 
was to have any application to salaried employees not 
represented by the Union. 
(b) This agreement by its terms established the 
retroactive date for union-represented salaried employ^ 
5 
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ees at May 1, 1950. (See December 1,1950 Notice (Plain-
tiff's Exhib i t s ) which has not been disputed by respond-
ent. 
(1) I t is inconceivable that the company and the 
union would agree in writing to a May 1, 1950 retro-
activity date if all of these salaried employees had a vest-
ed right by means of a prior implied in fact contract to 
retroactivity benefits back to March 9,1947, as contended 
by respondent. 
(2) The December 1, 1950 Notice (Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit 5) indicates very clearly that the company in its s&le 
discretion had extended this date of retroactivity to 
March 9, 1947 for all non-exempt salaried employees 
within the bargaining unit. This announcement changing 
the date of retroactivity from May 1, 1950 which was 
agreed upon in the collective bargaining agreement be-
tween the company and the union to March 9? 1947, clear-
ly indicates that any determination of retroactivity date 
was within the sole discretion of the company as late as 
December 1, 1950 which date was subsequent to respond-
ent's termination of employment with the company. 
II. 
It was appellant's intent to exclude from a retroactive 
salary adjustment any non-exempt salaried employee in the 
General Office who had quit prior to the establishment of 
the Standard Salary Scale. 
6 
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We had understood respondent's contention to be 
that the alleged implied contract to make a retroactive 
adjustment in respondent's compensation arose from pre-
vious statements, acts or conduct and not because of, 
but even in spite of appellant's intention. 
However, on page 16 of his brief respondent states: 
"I t was Respondent's contention therefore 
that the Company did not intend to prohibit for-
mer employees from receiving their retroactive 
pay." 
The evidence relied on refutes the contention. 
1. The policy manual of the Delaware corporation 
(Ex. P-13) expressly excluded "an individual who quit 
or was discharged" from any consideration in respect 
to a retroactive wage adjustment. That policy was the 
guide and standard used at the Geneva operations until 
June of 1951. (R. 99) The language above quoted was 
deleted in the policy manual issued June 1, 1951 (Ex. P-
12) and the words "as determined by the Salary Admin-
istration Committee" substituted therefor. The reasons 
for the change were fully explained by the Witnesses 
Friedley and Heald. (R. 107, 153-4) The best evidence 
of appellant's intent is its actual conduct and the fact 
is not disputed that no one who quit prior to the formu-
lation of the program was given any retroactive adjust-
ment in his compensation. (R. 106) 
7 
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2. The news release of March 26, 1951 (Ex. P-7) 
is at best a new spaper reporter's statement and is clearly 
hearsay. The statement evidences no intent other than 
one to make similar payments in the future to "similar 
workers" in the general or headquarters office. There 
is not the remotest suggestion or hint that individuals 
who quit would be paid retroactive compensation. The 
suggestion is indeed to the contrary; a worker is one who 
is working, not one who had quit and had done so with 
adequate warning as to what effect his action might have. 
(R.107) 
3. The announcements of December 15, 1950 (Ex. 
P-15, P-16) expressly state the requirement that one must 
be on the payroll on the effective date of the new salary 
scale in order to receive retroactive compensation. And 
these documents are the first announcement of any kind 
made by appellant after it had been definitely determined 
to adopt such a program for the General Office at the 
Geneva operations. 
4. The letter to Mr. Lawrence Lyman dated April 
2,1951 (Ex. P-8) reads in pa r t : 
"Included in this equity study is a retroactive 
payment back to March 9, 1947, where due, to 
those on the payroll at the time the program is 
installed, and retroactive payments to those on 
lay-off status at that time." 
Further comment is unnecessary — the intent is clear. 
(See also statement by respondent's witness T. Nelson, 
8 
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who said that he knew in February, 1951 that employees 
must be on the payroll in order to receive retroactive 
pay. (B. 130) ). 
5. Respondent's reliance on Exhibit P - l l (Resp. 
Brief, p. 17) is not readily understood. The exhibit wTas 
prepared after this suit had been commenced (R. 159) 
and for the sole purpose of answering respondent's Inter-
rogatory No. 8. (Answer No. 6, R. 51, 61). The computa-
tion sought by respondent was simply to determine what 
payments would have been made to respondent for the 
retroactive period March 9, 1947 to his termination, had 
he been fully qualified for any payments. It should be 
no surprise that such a computation could be made. 
III. 
There was no custom with respect to general salary in-
creases or otherwise which could be used as a basis for an 
implied in fact contract relating to a salary inequity pro-
gram and the details of eligibility for retroactive benefits. 
Respondent has relied upon an alleged "custom" as 
the basis upon which his implied in fact rests. (Resp. 
Brief p. 14) The court below instructed the jury that 
they could take into consideration "the establishment of a 
custom that the plaintiff would be treated in the same 
manner as some other employees who had received or 
were about to receive retroactive reclassification pay." 
(Inst. 11, R. 202, emphasis ours.) 
9 
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In its instruction No. 12, the court stated: 
"If you find that there was an established 
business custom known by both of the parties 
hereto, you are instructed that the terms of such 
custom shall constitute par t of the agreement, if 
any, between the parties since it will be assumed 
that each of the parties hereto contracted having 
in mind such custom." 
I t is elementary that a custom which is permitted 
to control the rights of the parties in the manner stated 
by the trial court must comply with all the requirements 
of an established business custom. None of such require-
ments are present in this case. 
A. The alleged custom is by respondent's own evi-
dence limited to the subject of general pay increases, and 
the custom, if any, relative thereto cannot control the 
rights of the parties with respect to a salary inequity 
or job evaluation program. The subjects are distinct, 
separate and unrelated. (R. 60, 97,126,136). 
R. The evidence does not support the existence of 
any custom at Geneva Steel Company prior to respond-
ent's termination of employment. 
Respondent has alleged a custom as to general sala-
ry increases. The following evidence was presented to 
support the allegations: 
Witness T. Nelson: ". . . I t was customary" 
that when "the hourly people would receive a 
blanket increase, some time following that, may-
10 
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\ 
be two or three weeks, the general office per-
sonnel would receive an increase somewhat simi-
lar to it." (Emphasis ours) (R. 126) 
Respondent stated that he he received two general 
increases during his employment and answered that 
the general practice as he understood it was, 
". . . the salaried employees were treated 
very similar to the hourly or union employees, 
they were paid a similar amount very shortly 
thereafter." (R. 136) 
F. Ray Friedley: 
;
 ". . . So far as the dates are concerned that 
is correct, so far as the rates of pay or general 
increases are concerned, they would differ of 
course." (R. 97) and "well, general increases being 
related usually to cost of living increase, the treat-
ment would be similar." 
J.D.Dillon: (R. 60) 
"Q. Were general pay increases granted union 
employees and non-unions employees at or 
near the same time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were those pay increases, although not actu-
ally the same, were they comparable and cor-
responding anywhere near to the pay in-
creases granted to union employees?" (Em-
phasis ours). 
11 
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f 
In addition, the facts, not in controversy, show that 
there were two general increases granted during respond-
ent's employment at Geneva kSteel Company: 
(1) April 1, 1947. 
Union employees—12-^c per hour. 
Non-union salaried employees—$22.00 per 
month. 
(2) July 16, 1948. 
Union Employees—9-i/£>c per hour. 
Exempt employees—10%. 
Non-exempt salaried employees: 
(a) Inside the plant—$17.00 per month. 
(b) General offices—10% 
(c) Respondent received 10% or $26.00 per 
month. 
Further testimony by J. O. Dillon: (R. 80) 
"There was no obligation on the part of the 
company to follow any particular line;" 
and upon further questioning: 
"Actually there was no practice, no procedure 
on the part of the company which required them 
to follow both through, or with any group that 
was not subject to a contract such as we had with 
the steelworkers." (R. 80) 
and on recross (R. 81), Mr. Dillon explained the loose 
use of the word "policies" and also the procedure used 
by management in evaluating general increase situations 
for employees not represented by a union. 
12 
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It is our position that such evidence does not satisfy 
the requirements of an established custom. Those re-
quirements as set forth in 25 C.J.S. 78, Customs and 
Usages, Section 2, are as follows: 
"Stated concisely and generally, a usage or 
trade custom must be ancient, certain and uni-
form, compulsory, consistent, general, continued, 
notorious, reasonable, not in contravention of law 
and acquiesced in." 
With respect to antiquity, the record shows that the 
custom claimed by respondent allegedly arose by virtue 
of two general salary increases within a two year period, 
which salary increases, by respondent's own admission, 
were not the same as the general wage increases negoti-
ated with the union. It is submitted that the test of an-
tiquity is not met by evidence of such a nature. 
The requirement of certainty and uniformity is fun-
damental to the existence of any established business 
custom. 
In Sickelco v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., I l l F. 2d 
746, the court held: 
"We think that the general doctrine is well 
put in 17 C. J . 451, Custom and Usages, §10; 'A 
usage or custom of trade must be certain and uni-
form in order to be binding. It is not sufficient 
that it is merely as certain as the nature of the 
business to which it applies will permit. Further, 
a loose and variable practice will not be allowed 
to control the rights of the parties, nor will an 
alleged usage which leaves some material element 
to the discretion of the individual.' 
13 
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"And in the same volume of Corpus Juris , 
453, Customs and Usages, Sec. 11, 'A custom must 
be compulsory, and not left to each one's option 
to obey it. Likewise, a usage, in order to be re-
garded as entering into a contract, must be clearly 
distinguished from mere acts of courtesy or ac-
commodation.' " 
In Nelson v. Southern Pacific Co., 15 Utah 325, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
"To establish the validity of a custom of 
trade, the usage must have existed such a length 
of time as to become generally known, and must 
be shown to be reasonable, uniform, certain, and 
not contrary to law. 
" . . . it is apparent that the court's definition 
is erroneous, because, as will be observed, it vio-
lated one of the essential elements necessary to 
the existence of a custom or usage of trade, which 
is that it is certain . . . A custom does not depend 
upon whether the business in which it is claimed 
will permit its existence. The question is, does it 
actually exist? Is it established as a fact? In 
addition to being certain, the custom or usage must 
be uniform, reasonable and not contrary to law. 
There are no comparative degrees as to the cer-
tainty of a custom. I t is either certain or it is 
not, and the charge of the court in qualifying this 
element is erroneous, . . ." 
See also: 
Securitv Commercial & Savings Bank v. 
Southern, etc. Bank, 74 Cal. App. 734, 241 
P. 945; 
14 
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Etna Forge and Bolt Co. v. Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co., 282 F. 786; 
Young v. One Hundred and Forty Thousand 
Hard Brick, 78 F. 149; 
Bowling v. Harrison, 6 How. (U.S.) 248, 12 
L. ed. 425. 
Kespondent's evidence fails completely to satisfy 
this requirement. The facts with respect to general sala-
ry increases show, and respondent readily admits, that 
the increases were not the same. He relies, however, up-
on a general practice of making "comparable" or "simi-
lar" or "anywhere near the same" general increases to 
support his allegations of an established business custom. 
Such a contention is untenable. Two general salary in-
creases which were neither certain nor uniform in their 
application cannot satisfy the certainty requirements 
necessary for the existence of an established business 
custom. 
A custom must also be compulsory and must not be 
left to each one's option to obey it, and a usage must 
clearly be distinguishable from mere acts of courtesy 
or accommodation. 25 C.J.S. Customs and Usage, Section 
5. See, also, Sickelco v. Union Pacific Eailroad Co., supra. 
The record shows and the fact is that the company was 
not required or obligated in the granting of general in-
creases to employees not represented by a Union and that 
Geneva Steel Company in its discretion, determined the 
nature and amount of all pay increases, general or other-
wise, with respect to such employees. (E. 81). Surely a 
15 
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desire on the part of the company to treat its non-union 
employees in an equitable manner on occasions of two 
genera] increases cannot give rise to a binding custom 
which requires identical treatment for all employees, 
Union and non-union, in the future. Appellant submits 
that the evidence nowhere supports the existence of 
such a custom at Geneva Steel Company. 
The requirement of consistency is not satisfied by 
the undisputed facts. How can two general salary in-
creases which differed from each other and from the gen-
eral wage increases negotiated with the Union meet this 
test of consistency? 
It should be apparent from the above that there was 
no custom of any kind at Geneva Steel Company upon 
which respondent justifiably could rely to establish his 
alleged implied in fact contract. 
CONCLUSION 
The far-reaching effect of a decision herein adverse 
to appellant cannot be over-estimated. Should the deci-
sion below be allowed to stand no reason is apparent why 
appellant would not be required to grant non-union em-
ployees every benefit negotiated by the unions. And the 
same rule would be applied to any employer who had 
made the slightest effort to treat all his employees in an 
equitable manner. We believe it may be safely assumed 
that the labor organizations would be among the first to 
object. The unions would be deprived of much of the 
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strength behind their organizing drives if it could be said 
that all benefits they may secure would as a matter of law 
be granted to all non-union employees. 
And if, in the past two unions representing em-
ployees of the same employer had accepted similar con-
tracts, would this court require in all future dealings that 
each union accept without further ado what the other had 
negotiated? We believe the answer is obvious. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court below 
erred in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict 
and in denying appellant's motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. The judgment should be reversed. 
C. C. PAKSONS, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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